2 edition of general analysis of exclusionary conduct and refusal to deal found in the catalog.
general analysis of exclusionary conduct and refusal to deal
Dennis W. Carlton
|Statement||Dennis W. Carlton.|
|Series||NBER working paper series -- working paper 8105, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 8105.|
|Contributions||National Bureau of Economic Research.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||31 p. :|
|Number of Pages||31|
A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided Date Posted: This paper analyzes the question: When should a single firm have a duty to deal with another? For example, refusal to deal and tying arrangements are typically examples of unilateral conduct that ought to be examined under section 4 of the Competition Act , unless the refusal to deal or tying arrangement is jointly effected by two or more parties at any level of the production : Yogesh Pai, Nitesh Daryanani.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., U.S. (), was a United States Supreme Court case that decided whether a dominant firm's unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor could establish a monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The unanimous Supreme Court agreed with the 10th Circuit that terminating a pro-consumer joint venture without a legitimate Citations: U.S. (more) S. Ct. ; 86 L. Ed. . Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal-Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. (); George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. (); Herbert Hovenk-Cited by: 4.
In antitrust, COVIDResponse-Series, doj, exclusionary conduct, ftc, truth on the market antitrust enforcement, COVID, exclusionary conduct, mergers, unilateral conduct. (by Trinko) instance of a unilateral refusal to deal, anticompetitive harm under the rule of reason must be proven. It may not be inferred from harm to competitors. "A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal --Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided," Antitrust Law Journal, (). (Reprinted in e-Commerce Antitrust & Trade Practices, Practicing Law Institute, ) "The Lessons from Microsoft," Business Economics, (January ).
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“A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal -- Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 68, Issue 3, pp. Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded* these.
The paper uses a series of economic models to answer the question, assuming the goal is to prevent harm to competition, and applies the economic analysis to the leading cases to show when antitrust enforcement is appropriate and when it is by: A general analysis of exclusionary conduct and refusal to deal: why Aspen and Kodak are misguided Author: Dennis W Carlton ; National Bureau of Economic Research.
A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided Article (PDF Available) in Antitrust Law Journal 68(3) March with Reads.
Importantly, although the term used in the doctrine is “exclusive” dealing, the agreement need not be literally exclusive.
Courts will often apply exclusive dealing to partial or de facto exclusive dealing agreements, where the contract involves a substantial portion of the other party’s output or requirements. US system, the liberalisation of network industries.
See for instance Dennis W Carlton, ‘A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal – Why Aspen Skiing and Kodak Are Misguided’ () 68 Antitrust Law Journal ; Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson and Jonathan Hooks, ‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under UnitedAuthor: Pablo Ibáñez Colomo.
This Article shows that proper economic analysis of how to judge the exclusionary conduct that must be causally connected to that monopoly power explains why monopoly power requires showing both. Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal--Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L.J.
(); see also Nov. 15 Hr'g Tr., supra note 2, at 8 (Steuer) (assessing exclusionary arrangements requires "looking more at foreclosure of competitors than anything else"); id.
at 54 (Jacobson. The central thesis of this article is that the use of the profit-sacrifice. test as the sole liability standard for exclusionary conduct, or as a required. prong of a multi-pronged liability.
Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 A NTITRUST L.J.–61 () (noting that “the duty to deal that a jo int venture of rivals has”.
A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided. Abstract. This paper analyzes the question: When should a single firm have a duty to deal with another.
The paper uses a series of economic models to answer the question, assuming the goal is to prevent harm to competition, and applies the Author: Dennis W.
Carlton. This question is a matter of much analysis by scholars, and the analyzing the established case law by the ECJ shows that this concept is still subject to evolution. 1 Firstly, there is a general consensus that undertakings are in principle free to deal with economic actors of their own choosing.
2 This notion was reiterated by the European. - Section 5 (paragraphs 51 to 92) describes the general framework for the analysis of exclusionary abuses; - Sections 6 to 9 (paragraphs 93 to ) describe the application of this general framework to a number of exclusionary abuses; - Section 10 (paragraphs to ) describes the approach to the analysis of aftermarkets.
practices under the rule of reason. The alternative, general welfare Power Requirements for Vertical Exclusionary Conduct agreements, a small subset of boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, and—by a very thin thread—some tying arrangements.
by: 2. If you are interested in more detail on the refusal-to-deal doctrine and its economics,I co-authored a chapter on Refusals to Deal with H.E. (Ted) Frech III, a Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara, in the American Bar Association book, Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution (2d ed.).
The book provides an in-depth analysis of the European Commission's Guidance on enforcement priorities under Article 82 and it makes a provocative proposal for further modernisation of the analysis of exclusionary abuses by recasting the prohibition of abuse of dominance as a norm which deals only with unilateral conduct.
'Exclusionary Practices provides a comprehensive and coherent treatment of the most challenging and controversial area of competition policy. 'Fumagalli, Motta, and Calcagno are at the forefront of the economic analysis of abuse of by: 2.
This superb book is a joy to read.' Tommaso Valletti, Chief Competition Economist, European Commission and Professor of Economics, Imperial College London 'The growing gap between US and EU enforcement of exclusionary conduct cries out for the type of careful economic explanation supplied in this volume.5/5(4).
bundling; and (v) refusal to deal (termination of an existing supply relationship). The main points are as follows: analysis should include the element of recoupment.
A recoupment requirement per se abusive and exclusionary conduct for which there is a rebuttable. 33 RAND J Econ (); Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal- Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L J ().
7 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself (Free Press 2d. 3) Approaches in refusal to deal/supply according to EU Art. 82 Guidance and Single Firm Conduct of the Sherman Act.
Summary of EU Art. 82 Guidance. The refusal to supply by undertaking includes a wide range of practices.
The most typical refusals are: a) refusal. The conduct element is very controversial and has resisted attempts by courts and commentators to develop a general definition: “Whether any particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern.” 7 As a result, courts have focused on standards for determining when.the refusal to deal is contrary to the defendants’ short-run interests demonstrated by the defendants’ sacrifice of short-run benefits and where the action would be irrational but for its Dennis W.
Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to.